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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH
UNIVERSITY CLUB, a non-profit
Utah corporation,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.
INVESCO HOLDrNG CORPORATION, a New York corporation, and
WASATCH REAL TY CORPORATION, a Utah corporation,
Defendants-Respondents.

Case No.
12792

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS
NATURE OF CASE
This is a contract case involving a lease wherein
plaintiff was lessee and defendants were lessors of certain
premises in an office building. Defendants' air conditioning equipment failed. _ By agreement, plaintiff installed a new unit for its own premises and waived claim
against defendants therefor. Plaintiff now sues for damages, seeking to avoid the waiver in the agreement.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
Defendants moved for summary judgment, dismissing all claims, except declaring plaintiff was entitled to
1

abatement of rent for the period the premises were unten.
antable (R. 41). The trial court granted defendants' mo.
tion and entered summary judgment accordingly rn.
113-4).
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendants pray the judgment be affirmed.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The "Statement of Facts" in plaintiff's brief is so
argumentative and based on incompetent evidence that
defendants are compelled to state the facts accurately.
In 1963, plaintiff leased for 42 years the top two
floors in defendant's office building (R. 43).
The air conditioning system maintained by defend·
ants for the entire building failed Friday evening, July
18, 1969, because an employee of the independent con·
tractor defendants hired to service the air conditioner put
too much acid in the system (R. 18, 34; Miller depo. pp.
26-8). It did not fail from faulty maintenance by de·
fendants as plaintiff's brief implies (p. 3).
Plaintiff claims its premises were rendered untenant·
able thereby from July 18 to July 30, 1969 (R. 80).
The lease provides (R. 47-56):
"16. UTILITIES. Landlord shall furnish at
its expense ... air conditioning for the premises
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and shall maintain a comfortable temperature
therein at all times.
"19. REPAIRS. Lessor shall maintain and
keep in good repair ... all machinery and equipment provided for the use of the entire building
such as ... air conditioning ... .Neither Lessor
nor Lessee shall be liable to the other for any
damages sustained to the property of the other
resulting from the failure of either to make any
repairs required to be made hereunder, except that
the one failing to make such repairs shall be liable to the one suffering such damage if the latter has given written notice to the former of the
need for such repairs and the former has failed to
make the same with due diligence. If by reason
of the making of repairs required to be made by
Lessor hereunder, Lessee is deprived of the use or
benefit of all or a substantial part of the premises,
rent shall be abated or reduced according to the
extent to which Lessee is deprived of such use or
benefit. (Emphasis added)
"20 DAMAGE OR DESTRUCTION. If the
demised premises, or the building of which the demised premises are to be a part, is destroyed or
damaged, Lessor agrees to replace or repair the
same with reasonable promptness and dispatch,
and to allow Lessee an abatement in the rent for
such time as the leased premises are untenantable
or proportionately for such portion of the leased
premises as shall be untenantable, and the parties
covenant and agree that the terms of this lease
shall not otherwise be affected.
"29 UNPERFORMED COVENANTS OF
LESSOR. If ... Lessor fails to make any repairs
or do any work required by the Lessor by the
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provisions of this lease, or in any other respect
fails to perform any of the covenants ... and such
default continues for a period of 30 days after
written demand for performances given by Lessee,
then . . . Lessee may make such payments and
cure such other defaults on behalf of Lessor and
in connection therewith, do all work and make all
payments deemed necessary by Lessee. Lessor
agrees to reimburse Lessee upon demand the
amounts paid by Lessee ....
"31. ALTERATIO NS. Lessee agrees not to
make any changes, alterations or additions about
the said building or premises without first obtain·
ing the consent of the Lessor, consent not to be
arbitrarily or unreasonably withheld .... "
By letter of Monday, July 22, 1969 <R. 64-5), plain·
tiff wrote to Invesco, saying:
"You are aware that the air conditioning sys·
tern for the building ceased operating on Friday,
July 19, and is still not operating. While we as·
sume you were not able to anticipate this occur·
rence and while we understand you are taking
steps to make repairs, you may not be aware of
the problems the failure has caused this Club ....
<Problems are outlined) We feel that a default
has occurred under our lease for which you are
responsible .... Without waiving our right to re·
cover the damages we have suffered and will con·
tinue to suffer by reason of the default, the Club
feels that it is essential that you cure such defaull
immediately .... We offer our complete coopera·
tion and assistance in taking what steps are nee·
essary or appropriate. We look forward to meet·
ing with your representatives at an early date Ill
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learn of your plans for correcting the air conditioning problems and to find out how we may
assist is such plans." <Emphasis added)
Nowhere in the letter did plaintiff assert "a right
to cure the defect" as plaintiff's brief, page 2, claims. Instead the letter insisted "that you cure such default
immediately."
Plaintiff's own affidavit asserts defendants' executive vice president, Ron Jefferies, informed plaintiff of
the availability of an air conditioning unit adequate to
cool the premises occupied by plaintiff (R. 80).
The very next day, by letter agreement of Tuesday,
July 23, 1969 (R. 66-7>, the parties agreed:
" This letter will confirm our @"efendants.0
understanding as to the terms and conditions
under which you (plaintiff) plan to install a 60ton air chiller for the use of you premises.
"You are contracting ... for the purchase and
installation of this unit. Such purchase and installation shall be your sole responsibility and all
costs shall be borne by you. You will procure all
necessary permits and shall secure and furnish us
with lien waivers on all labor done and materials
furnished, and you shall hold us harmless from
any claims made resulting from such installation.
Also, you will not make any claim against us for
any of the costs of purchase or installation.
"We consent to your use without charge by
us of sufficient space in the penthouse of the
University Club Building for such unit, and we
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consent ot tying such unit into the water tower of
the building. You may have use of the water
from the tower without charge provided that the
tower has sufficient capacity to supply the needs
of other chillers and w<1 ter needs of the building as
well as the needs of your unit. However, if such
capacity is not adequate, we reserve the right to
discontinue your use of water from the tower.

-and

''You

-mh er- gtteh- ffl't

-d-m-a-i-ntenanee fill d-op·
-ffatttrrref-the-tt:rtit----attd will assume sole responsibility for the adequacy of
cooling capacity of the unit for your entire premises. (sic)

"In consideration for these commitments b)
us to you your signature below will indicate your
conent to these terms and conditions." (Emphasis added)
The parties struck out of the letter the language indicated
and at the conclusion of the letter the parties added the
following:

"It is mutually understood and agreed that
this letter does not waive any of the rights or cmenants entitled to by the Lessee under its lease
agreements for the premises leased in the University Club Building."
The letter was signed for plaintiff by its president, F. C.
Colladay.
Plaintiff did install its own permanent unit by Juh
30, accepting the free penthouse space therefor, the frer
6

tying of the unit into the building water tower and has
ever since accepted free use of water from the tower
pursuant to the letter agreement.
In reliance on the July 23 letter agreement, defendants did not furnish temporary air conditioning to plaintiff's premises or repair defendants' old unit within the 30day period provided in paragraph 29 of the lease. Within
six weeks, defendants installed a new unit, required to be
custom made, for the entire building (depo., p. 33). The
old unit could have been repaired, but it would have been
as costly as a new one and there would be no guarantee
on the old one (depo., p. 33).
Notwithstanding the July 23 agreement and paragraph 19 of the lease, plaintiff sues for ( 1) the cost of the
air conditioner it installed; (2) lost profits; (3) food
spoilage; (4) future loss of good will; and (5) attorney's
fees on theories of breach of contract, unjust enrichment
and negligence (R. 1-7).
On these facts in the record, the trial court granted
defendants' motion for summary judgment, dismissing all
claims except declaring that plaintiff was entitled to rent
abatement which defendants admitted plaintiff was entitled to receive (R. 41, 112).

ARGUMENT
POINT I. PLAINTIFF MISSTATES TI-IE FACTS.
Plaintiff's statement of the facts is not supported by
the record and states facts based on incompetent evidence.

7

The inaccuracies will largely be pointed out in this Point.
Plaintiff's brief, page 6, says:
"At the time of the breakdown, representatives of the Club immediately contacted representatives of Lessor in an attempt to work out a plan
where the air conditioning system could be restored as soon as possible."
Plaintiff's letter of July 22 stated, "The Club feels it is
essential that you (defendants) cure such default immediately," contrary to plaintiff's brief, top of page 7, which
claims "the letter called attention to the ... Club's right
to cure the defect at the expense of the Lessor."
Thus, it is seen that plaintiff insisted upon an immediate plan to provide special air conditioning for its
own premises. Defendants, of course, had to restore air
conditioning for the whole building and did so. In so
doing, air conditioning would be supplied to plaintiff
without additional expense. Not content with rent
abatement, plaintiff not only desired immediate action in
less than 30 days, but also desired and agreed in writing
to a plan for permanent capital expenditure for air
conditioning for plaintiff's premises only by the letter of July 23. In so doing, plaintiff agreed "such
purchase and installation shall be your (plaintiff's)
sole responsibility and all costs shall be borne by you
(plaintiff)," and that plaintiff would "not make any
claim against us (defendants) for any of the costs of
purchase or installation." Notwithstanding, plaintiff
now sues for the entire capital cost of purchase and instal-
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lation cost for its own permanent unit of some $16,000
CR. 18), plus the damages to its property waived by the
lease.
Plaintiff's brief, page 6, says:
"The Club representatives were informed by
representatives of Lessor that the air conditioning
service could not be restored within the 30-day period specified in paragraph 29 of the lease; restoration of service would involve two or three
months" (R. 80).
This implies the fact to be that defendants could not, or
refused, to supply air conditioning to plaintiff's premises
for more than 30 days. The actual quotation from the
record, plaintiff's own affidavit, on R. 80 is:
"Representatives of defendants stated to me
that it would take approximately two or three
months before the system (meaning defendants'
entire system) could be replaced."
It is important to recognize that nowhere does the record
show that defendants could not, or refused to, provide
air conditioning for plaintiff's premises within thirty days,
as plaintiff's brief implies. Temporary air conditioning
could have been rented or portable coolers temporarily
installed. Defendants' own system could have been repaired. Obviously, the reason defendants did not provide air conditioning within the thirty-day period to
plaintiff's premises is that the parties agreed on July 23,
(R. 66), one day after defendant found a suitable air conditioning unit, and one day after plaintiff's demand let-
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ter (R. 64), and five days after the air conditioning failure (with Saturday and Sunday intervening), that plaintiff would purchase, install and have control of its own
unit, an advantage to plaintiff, in return for free roof
space, free use of defendants' water tower, free water for
plaintiff's unit, etc. The parties after negotiation struck
the clause from the letter agreement (R. 66), that plaintiff would "assume the cost of electricity and such other
on-going costs of maintenance and operation of the unit."
In consideration of all that, plaintiff expressly agreed:
"Such purchase and installation (of the unit)
shall be your (plaintiff's) sole responsibility and
all costs shall be borne by you (plaintiff) ... Also,
you (plaintiff) will not make any claim against
us (defendants) for any of the costs of purchase
or installation."
Plaintiff's brief, middle of page 7, says:

"It was apparently acknowledged by both
parties that since more than thirty days would be
required to replace the inoperative unit, the Club
had the right to purchase a unit and cure the
Lessor's default in accordance with paragraph 29
of the lease."
Here, plaintiff's whole case, the whole attempt to
avoid the clear written agreements in the lease and in the
July 23 agreement not to sue, is bottomed and here it
fails. Such statement is clearly not supported by the rec·
ord, as shown above. Plaintiff simply ignores the fact
that defendants might have furnished air conditioning for
plaintiff's premises within the thirty days, even on
porary basis. Plaintiff in fact had permanent air cond1·
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tioning installed for its own premises within three weeks.
Plaintiff's letter of July 22 admits "we understand you are
taking steps to make repairs." After all, it was defendants
who located the very unit plaintiff installed. Defendants
might have installed it within thirty days had plaintiff, by
the letter agreement of July 23, not made such performance unnecessary. Indeed, plaintiff, by the July 23 letter
agreement, deprived defendants of the right to provide air
conditioning for plaintiff's premises in thirty days and
induced defendants not to do so. Then plaintiff turns
right around and says defendants breached the lease by
not performing the very act plaintiff expressly accepted as
performance and sues for damage for the very same act
it expressly accepted even though it expressly waived that
dRmage claim.
Plaintiff's brief, bottom of page 7, next says:
"Ronald Jeffries, a representative of Lessor, informed the Club of the availability of an air conditoning unit adequate to cool the premises occupied by the Club (R. 80). Representatives of the
Club investigated the information and learned
that such unit was in fact available, but that it
had to be immediately purchased (R. 80-U ...
(a) nd pursuant to the combined efforts of the
Club and Lessor, the Club purchased the available
unit" ( R. 79-82) .
Based upon defendants' telling plaintiff of the unit,
plaintiff's unilateral action in buying it, and defendants'
calling a meeting, plaintiff now claims "duress and undue
influence," even though such was never pleaded. Plaintiff ignores the fact that when it unilaterally bought the
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unit and not through "combined efforts," it had made
no arrangements for space, water or water tower; yet,
even though plaintiff was given these free in consideration of its unambiguous promise not to make claim
against defendants for purchase or installation costs,
plaintiff claims that its own, unilateral, "bootstrap" conduct constitutes a basis for avoiding its promise in the
very agreement whose benefits it has willingly accepted
to date.
Plaintiff ignores the fact that the record does not
show defendants had purchased the unit at the time of
the July 23 meeting and letter agreement. The letter
ar;reement refers to the chiller "which you (plaintiffl
plnn to install" and says "you (plaintiff) are contracting
... for the purchase and installation of this unit."
Plaintiff's affidavit from Bullen, the club manager
(R. 81), paragraph 7, says plaintiff purchased the unit
"with the acquiesence of defendant." That is an incompetent conclusion. The affidavit does not say what defendants' representative said or did. Rainford v. Rytting
( 1969), 22 Utah 2d 252, 451 P.2d 769, holds that affidavits in opposition to motion for summary judgment
must set forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence. Clearly, defendants' mere telling )s:(' plaintiff of
the unit's availability (the only fact in the sentence from
the Bullen affidavit), is not a direction that plaintiff
should purchase it and is not "assistance," "joint efforts,''
"combined efforts" or "acquiesence" on defendants' part.
Defendants advised the trial court this portion of the
affidavit should be stricken (R. lOQ) and all references to
this claim in defendants' brief should be similarly stricken.
12

Plaintiff's brief, page 8, says:
"With full knowledge of the precarious position in which the Club had been placed by the
Lessor's breach of the lease, and with full realization of the purchase of the replacement unit pursuant to the joint efforts of the parties, the representatives of Lessor called a meeting for July 23,
1969."
This argumentative "Statement of Facts" is wrong
for a number of reasons: ( 1) Defendants had not breached
the lease; They had at least 30 days after written demand
for performance to make the repairs under paragraph 29
of the lease, or more likely, a reasonable time under paragraphs 19 and 20 to do so; (2) defendants did not have
knowledge the Club had purchased the unit when the
meeting was called, as shown above; (3) plaintiff had not
purchased the unit when the meeting was called (R. 66);
and (4) the unit was not purchased through the "joint
cfforts" of the parties as shown above.
Plaintiff's brief says, middle of page 8, "Lessor employed its attorney to prepare a letter agreement." It is
not true that defendants solely prepared the agreement of
July 23, for both parties mutually struck the language on
the first page and plaintiff added the clause on the second
page of the July 23 letter agreement (R. 81), so it cannot be said "defendants prepared the letter." It is very
significant that plaintiff retained its will to bargain for
these changes, for this shows reasonable minds could not
differ in finding plaintiff was not under duress when it
bargained away "any claim for the costs of purchase or
installation" of the unit.
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Plaintiff's brief, top of page 10, says:
"There was nothing which prevented Lessor
from presenting the letter prior to the time the
Club had committed itself to the purchase and installation of the new unit" <Miller deposition,
page 15, line 22) .
That statement of fact is wrong. The whole tenor of the
Miller deposition, page 14, was that, at the time of the
July 23 meeting, she did not know when plaintiff bought
the unit (p. 14, line 11), only knew that "it was being
considered that the Club would buy the unit," (p. 15,
line 3), and that she "was a new employee, had never
met any of the people before and was totally in the dark"
(p. 11, line 21). No wonder her deposition, page 15,
line 22, reads not as plaintiff's brief says, but:

"Q.

Do you recall any circumstances that
prevented submitting this letter or any other
agreement prior to the date it was actually
submitted?

"A.

No."

As plaintiff's brief says, the timing of the letter is
very significant. The fact is on July 22, plaintiff wrote
defendants (R. 64):
"While we assume you were not able to anticipate (the air conditioning failure) and while we
understand that you are taking steps to make repairs ... , it is essential that you cure
immediately ... We look forward to meeting wit,,
your representatives ... to learn your plans . · ·
14

Thus on July 22 plaintiff had not been informed of the
availability of the new unit. Yet by the next day plaintiff
had been told of it and plaintiff expressly agreed the next
day on July 23 to buy it, to install it, to assume sole responsibility for installation and not to make any claim
for the costs of purchase or installation against defendants. Defendants could hardly have acted with greater
dispatch, but nevertheless plaintiff infers sinister motives
from the timing of the July 23 agreement. Mere illfounded inference will not substitute for facts in the record to resist the motion for summary judgment. Dupler
v. Yates, IO Utah 2d 251, 351 P.2d 64.
The same may be said for plaintiff's claim in its brief,
page 9:
"
( t) he representatives of the Club refused to
agree to waive their reimbursement rights of paragraph 29 of the Lease" <R. 81).
The actual quote from R. 81, the affidavit of Bullen,
plaintiff's manager, is:
"Defendants ... insisted the letter be signed before defendants would allow the air conditioning
unit to be installed."
Nowhere does the record show any discussion of waiver
of rights under paragraph 29 of the lease. The Bullen
affidavit is a pure incompetent conclusion on his part
anyway, for he does not say what defendants said.
Nowhere does the record competently show that any
party, or either party, said it did not intend to alter or
15

amend the lease or waive the Club's rights under the
lease as plaintiff's brief, page 9, claims R. 81-2 and the
Miller deposition, pp. 11-3, says. R. 81-2 is Bullen's affidavit, containing not what persons said or did, but his
conclusions of his unexpressed intent, and he was not
even a signatory to the July 23 agreement. His conclusions in his affidavit do not even say he did not intend to
amend the lease. The Miller deposition, pp. 11-3, said
Mrs. Miller did not remember if Jefferies said it was not
his purpose to alter or amend the lease, but such was her
"impression," to which counsel three times on page 12
directed her to simply say what Jefferies said.
The whole question of "intent to amend the lease"
is immaterial in any event, for the lease and letter agreement speak for themselves in that regard. The lease has
not, in fact, been amended. It waives claim for property
damage, yet plaintiff makes claim for property damage.
The lease does not give plaintiff a right to claim the
capital cost of a new air conditioning unit from defendant
in absence of consent by defendants <lease, para. 31, R.
57), particularly when the written consent and agreement waived claim for the cost thereof. Yet plaintiff
seeks to avoid that agreement. It is plaintiff who must
claim the lease was amended; yet plaintiff argues it was
not amended.
The balance of the claimed "facts" set out in plaintiff's brief is so obviously argumentative and unfounded
by the record as to not require further specific itemization.
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POINT II. THE PARTIES MUTUALLY RELEASED EACH OTHER FOR PROPERTY DAMAGE
CLAIMS FOR THE OTHERS' FAILURE TO REPAIR.
By paragraph 19 of the lease, the parties agreed that
defendants "shall maintain and keep in good repair ...
the air conditioning." They then agreed: "Neither Lessor nor Lessee shall be liable for the other for any damages sustained to the property of the other resulting from
... failure ... to make any repairs." They excepted from
the waiver the case where one fails to repair after "written notice" from the other of need for repairs and "the
former has failed to make the same with due diligence."
Then the lease expressly provided that, notwithstanding
the waiver of property damage claims, the Lessee would
receive rent abatement while the repairs were made.
There is no question but that plaintiff's claim arises
from defendants' failure to keep the air conditioning in
good repair. That specifically is what plaintiff pleaded in
paragraphs 7, 10, 14, 17 and 20 of its complaint for defendants' breach of the lease (R. 3-5). No breach of the
quiet enjoyment or utilities paragraphs was pleaded. Even
if they had been, the lease still must be read as a whole.
The specific reason for claimed breach of the quiet enjoyment and utilities paragraphs still was the failure to keep
the air conditioning in good repair and, therefore, the
mutual waiver of property damage claims still applies. It
is because of this waiver that the trial court held plaintiff was entitled to rent abatement, as rent abatement
was excepted from the property damage waiver and,
hence, is the only remedy available to plaintiff from the
damage claims alleged.
17

In any event, defendant did not breach the "Quiet
Enjoyment" clause. An eviction or disturbance of possession is required for breach of that clause (51 C.J.S.
Landlord and Tenant, Section 323 (3)). Plaintiff did not
move out of the premises. Cases might be imagined
where unjustified and inexcusable failure to provide elevator service, heat, light and power for a long, indefinite
time in the future might justify a tenant's moving out
under claim of breach of quiet enjoyment, but such is not
the record here.
Certainly, the parties may limit their damage claims
by contract, particularly as here, when each mutually
agreed to limit its claims against the other.
There is nothing ambiguous or unfair about the
mutual property damage waiver clause. It is rather
astounding that in the face of the waiver, plaintiff claims
in its brief that, of the remedies sought by the complaint,
"there is no provision in the lease that even suggests that
rent abatement is the exclusive remedy." (Brief, p. 14)
The law of Utah is not that a lease is construed most
strongly against the lessor, but is instead that ambiguous
language is construed against the party who drafted it,
and when possible, the court should give effect to ail
words and clauses and construe the lease as a whole.
Powerine Co. v. Russell's, Inc., 103 Utah 441, 135 P.2d
906; Wolfe v. White, 119 Utah 183, 225 P.2d 729.
Here there is no evidence as to which party drew the
lease. The damage waiver clause in question certainly
is not ambiguous and it cannot be ignored as plaintiff
urges.
18

While no argument is had with the legal principles
plaintiff cites from Estate of Corbin v. McKey & Poague,
Inc, (211, 1969), 245 N.E.2d 117, the case is not here
applicable. It involved an exculpatory clause providing
the lessor would not be liable for any damages for loss of
property nor would rent be abated by reason of landlord's
failure to repair as well as "any act by lessor." The lessor unjustifiably locked lessee's representative out and refused to allow rent abatement. Tenant there claimed
only rent abatement. These two facts distinguish the
case from the case at bar, for here the rent has been
abated and the breach was failure to repair. The specific
holding-there was:
"We will not construe 'any act' to be so all
inclusive as to mean that when a lessor wrongfully deprives a tenant of possession, the rental is
not abated."
Plaintiff urges this proposition: When two lease
clauses provide the tenant is to receive quiet enjoyment
to, and air conditioning for, the premises, and a third
clause provides on failure to maintain the air conditioning
equipment property damages are waived, that the damages are not so waived. Plaintiff cites no authority whatever for that proposition.
The mutual waiver of claim for "any damage sustained to ... property" includes the waiver of claim for
plaintiff non-profit corporation's lost profits.

In Wood v. Security Mutual Life Insurance Com(Neb., 1924), 198 N.W. 573, 34 A.LR. 712, plain-

pany,
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I,

I

:I

tiff leased premises from defendant under a lease whicn
provided the tenant would hold the insurance company
harmless "for damage to the person or property" of the
tenant during defendant's reconstruction. During reconstruction, plaintiff's barbershop was made untenantable
by dust, etc., and plaintiff sued for damage to his business, saying the exculpatory clause pertained only to hi 1
tangible property. The court held to the contrary
numerous cases ("the weight of authority") that "prop·
erty" includes "business" and "damage" includes "loss.''
That case is precisely in point here.
The annotation at 34 A.LR. 712 cites 11 cases to I
that "property" includes "business."
No Utah cases precisely in point could be found, but
Clayton v. Bennett 0956), 5 Utah 2d 152, 298 P.2d 531,
while dealing with the constitutionality of professional Ii·
censing statutes, holds the right to engage in business ii
a property right.

Hargis v. Sample (Mo., 1957), 306 S.W.2d 564, cited
by plaintiff, is contrary to the weight of authority. It
cites no authority whatever for its holding. It is distin·
guishable on its facts. There the hotel lease, where busi·
nesses are not ordinarily carried on, said:
"Under the marginal heading 'Damage to
Tenants' Property': 'Lessor shall not be liable to
said lessee or any other person or corporation, in·
eluding employees for any damage to their person
or property cause db y wa t er ... '"
The court held:
20

"We have the view ... that the parties ... ,
when they referred to 'lessee's property' under the
marginal heading 'Tenants' Property,' intended to
and did use the word 'property' to describe ...
personal property ...
"That such was likely, it seems to us, is indicated by the fact that the entire clause ... included damage to the property of guests or employees. Property of employees and guests would,
of course, be the items of tangible personal property that those persons ... might have within the
rented structure. And if so, then the word property indicating 'lessee's property' would have no
different connotation." (Emphasis theirs)
Here the damage waiver clause contains no words
which tend to show anything less than all property in its
broadest sense was intended by the parties. It says merely "any damage ... to property."
Indeed, it can be argued that were intangible property claims here waived, then there would be no need
for the rent abatement clause. If only tangible property
claims were waived, then the tenant would be entitled to
rent abatement or claim for loss of use of the premises
without expression of that right in the lease. Since the
parties expressly preserved plaintiff's right to rent abatement, they must have intended that the right would be
lost without expression and that could only follow if the
property damage waiver were broader than personal
property and included claim for loss of use of the premises, which is the equivalent of rent abatement.
Plain tiff cites Wells v. Jersey City, 207 Fed. 871
(1913), for the proposition that "less of business" is not
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included within waiver of
to property. The case
is not in point. There, a statute provided:
"(W) henever any buildings or other real or personal property shall be destroyed . . . (by) mob or
riot, the city in which the same shall occur, orif
not in a city, then the county in which such property was situated, shall be liable to ... the party
whose property was thus destroyed . . . for the
damages sustained."
A jury awarded plaintiff $300 damage to tangible prop
erty and $43,000 damage to plaintiff's business, but the
court held the latter was not included within the statute.
The court said at 219 Fed. 701:
"Strictly, and as a matter of abstract reasoning,
'property' in a thing is different from the thini
itself. It is a right to use, enjoy and control, ano
therefore is neither visible nor tangible. In thi1
sense, which is often properly applied, the right to
carry on a business is property. But we are not
able to agree that such a conception was presenl
in the mind of the draftsman or of the New Jerse\
Legislature. If it had been, the word 'properti
alone would have been employed, for nothin1
more would have been needed. It seems plain.
however, that a more limited conception of 'property' was embodied in the statute, for the phrase:
'buildings or other real or personal properD'·
while it is awkward and incorrect, does convey the
idea that the 'property' thought of consists. o1
things and not of intangible rights. And we fml
the same idea again in section 5 (and also in sec
tion 7, which we need not quote), where the pro.r11
erty is twice referred to as existing
space-as 'situated,' or 'situate,' in a descnbe·
municipality."

22

That case must be considered in light of its own distinguishable facts. If anything it supports defendants' position, for the word "property" was here employed alone.
Plaintiff's brief fails, on the other hand, to distinguish the contrary holding in the Nebraska lease case,
precisely in point, or the weight of authority from the
A.L.R. annotation, all of which were cited to the trial
court. ( R. 73)

Plaintiff cited to the trial court Lee & Eastes, Inc. v.
Public Service Commission, I Wash. <I 958), 328 P.2d
700. It supports defendants' position. There, a statute
said common carrier permits could not be transferred except on showing that "property rights might be affected
thereby." On application to transfer an insolvent carrier's permit, protestants claimed there was no good will
or going business value in the insolvent carrier's business
and therefore the certificate could not be transferred. The
case factually is of no assistance here, but for what it is
worth, the Washington court cited cases holding:
" 'Property' is a word of very broad meaning and
when used without qualification may reasonably
be construed to include obligations, rights and
other intangibles as well as physical things . . .

The right to operate a business is a property
right."

It is difficult to imagine how failure to repair air

conditioning could result in damage to any personal or
tangible property. The only likely damage the parties
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could have anticipated would be intangible property dam.
age, such as loss of profits.
Finally, had the parties intended "any property" tD
be narrower than its customary meaning, they could haw
easily expressed "personal property" or "contents" or
some such similar language.
It is noted this exculpatory clause is drafted in favor
of both parties, for both released each other. There is.
therefore, no reason or rule which requires it to be strictl)
construed against defendants.
The trial court dismissed plaintiff's negligence claim
not only on the basis of paragraph 19 of the lease, but
also on the basis that there is no evidence of negligence b)
defendants in the record. The air conditoning failed because an employee of an independent contractor hired b)
defendants to maintain the system put in too much ada
(R. 34). That record does not support a claim of negli·
gent act or omission by defendants. Plaintiff's claim is
based strictly on contract, for without the contract, defendants had no duty to provide air conditioning, and no
act or omission by defendants interrupted the air conditioning.
No question of fact exists as to defendants' failure to
make repairs "after due diligence." Three working day1
after the failure, plaintiff signed the agreement of July 25
that it would "assume sole responsibility for the adequac)
and cooling capacity of the unit." The question is no!
whether a delay of six weeks was "due diligence" becaus:
plaintiff accepted the arrangement set out in the July 2i
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letter. The question, therefore, is whether plaintiff bargained away its claim. In any event, the court properly
ruled as a matter of law that three working days is "due
diligence," particularly when plaintiff in effect so agreed
by the letter agreement of July 23.
POINT III. THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN
DENYING PLAINTIFF REIMBURSEMENT FOR
CURING LESSOR'S DEFAULT.
Plaintiff did not cure defendants' default, and certainly had no right so to do until 30 days after notice.
Nowhere does the record show defendants could not have
provided, or refused to provide, temporary air conditioning to plaintiff's premises in 30 days. Even plaintiff's
brief, page 24, admits defendants had the available opportunity of repairing rather than replacing in six weeks 'the
damaged unit. Instead, plaintiff insisted upon immediate
capital expenditure for plaintiff's own purposes, and
agreed that for the free space, free use of water and water
tower, to be provided by defendants, and in consideration
of defendants' striking the clause that plaintiff would be
responsible for electricity and maintenance of the new
unit, that plaintiff would assume sole responsibility for its
own unit that plaintiff would buy and install it and not
sue defendants therefor. To claim it "cured lessor's default," plaintiff would have had to repair or replace defendants' air conditioner for the whole building.
Consider the unfairness of plaintiff's position. Plaintiff first insisted on immediate special action by a large
capital expenditure for special air conditioning equipment
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for its own premises, which plaintiff had no right to in
stall without defendants' consent <lease, para. 31, R. 571.
and then after defendants replaced the unit for the entht
building, which could have served plaintiff too, plaintil
expects defendants to pay for the special unit for plain
tiff's premises, even though plaintiff agreed defendant·
would not be liable for such, and this after plaintiff, o·.
the letter of July 23, induced defendant not to provic1
cooled air for plaintiff at an earlier date.
Plaintiff's Point III argues plaintiff's promises in th
July 23 agreement should be ignored on grounds of durn·
even though plaintiff has continued to accept the benefit1
of defendants' promises in the same agreement. Plain
tiff says there exists a fact issue of "duress and undue in·
fluence." Even if plaintiff purchased its unit with tl11
"assistance and acquiescence" of defendants, such wouk
not make "duress or undue influence," as plaintiff clail11!
to avoid the July 23 agreement.
Undue influence requires either a confidential reli
tionship or the destruction of the promisor's will. Cer
tainly the affidavit of Bullen (R. 79), not a signatoryt
the July 23 agreement, does not show that the will of defendants was substituted for the will of the Universir
Club, a non-profit corporation, or its president wn·
signed the agreement.
1

Duress is defined in Fox v. Piercey, 119 Utah 36;
227 P.2d 763, 766 0951), as a "wrongful act or thre:r
which actually puts the victim in such fear as to compt
him to act against his will." Was Mr. Calladay, wn
signed the July 23 agreement for plaintiff, in fear!?
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says:

State v. Barlow, 107 Utah 292, 153 P.2d 654 0944),

"As a rule, in a transaction requiring mutual consent, if consent is obtained by coercion, the victim
may either affirm or avoid the transaction, but he
may not claim the benefits and escape the obligations."
Duress in cases of business compulsion is not established by the pressure of financial circumstances or by one
party insisting on a legal right and the other yielding
thereto. "The doctrine of business compulsion cannot
be predicated upon a demand which is lawful or upon
doing or threatening to do that which a party has a right
to do." 25 Am.Jur.2d 363-4, Duress, Section 7.
Clear and convincing proof of duress is required to
avoid a transaction. 25 Am.Jur.2d 392, Duress, Section

31.

Even assuming that defendants knew plaintiff was
purchasing the air conditioning unit on July 22, does the
record clearly and convincingly establish that the next
day the University Club was thereby compelled to act
against its will when it made the July 23 agreement?
Consider:
1. Plaintiff bargained for deletion of the clause that
plaintiff would supply electricity and maintenance for the
new unit. This shows plaintiff retained its bargaining

will.
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2. No showing is made that plaintiff could nr,
have cancelled its air conditioning purchase-or whatt}
cancellation cost might have been, if any.
Plaintiff's purchase contract is not even in the ret
ord. All we have is Bullen's conclusion in his affidavi.
that "plaintiff purchased the unit" (R. 81). The recori.
is devoid of any showing that plaintiff had no other em
nomic choice but to sign the July 23 agreement. Hence
not only did plaintiff have other remedies available ratt
er than sign the July 23 agreement under economic du
ress, as claimed, but moreover there is no basis in lac
for reasonable minds to even believe plaintiff was uncle:
duress.
3.

Mrs. Miller testified ( depo., p. 10, line 20):
"They (Mr. Bullen and Mr. Calladay) didn't ex
press any dissatisfaction over the proposal (tf11
July 23 agreement). There was a sentence or tw
they did wish changed or deleted."

These facts in the record affirmatively show the absenc1
of duress.
4. Plaintiff had a perfect right to insist on sorn1
consideration for the free use of the roof space, the tyinr
of plaintiff's unit into defendants' water tower, free water
for plaintiff's unit, etc., whether or not defendants kne1'
plaintiff had bought the air conditioner.
Plaintiff simply wanted its own air conditioner. De·
fendants' own unit for the entire building could just a·
well serve plaintiff. Considering the large expense 01

I
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plaintiff's new unit and the additional costs of utilities
and maintenance that would have to be borne, it certainly was not unusual that plaintiff would agree not to sue
defendants for its initial cost or that defendants would insist on such waiver. It was plaintiff's duty to make arrangements with defendants before getting into its
claimed predicament. Paragraph 31 of the lease specifically required plaintiff to obtain defendants' consent before making alterations or additions about the building.
Defendants' lawful demands in this regard cannot form
the basis for claim of economic duress as a matter of law.
As shown, the record does not contain any competent admissable facts on which reasonable minds could find duress or undue influence. When reasonable minds cannot
differ on an alleged question of fact, the case is ripe for
summary judgment as a matter of law. The record indeed affirmatively shows the absence of duress or undue
influence as a matter of law.
Plaintiff further claims in Point III the July 23
agreement, bargaining away claim for purchase and installation costs, is ambiguous. Plaintiff says the added
clause at the end, reading that "this letter does not waive
any of the rights or covenants entitled to by the Lessee,"
is contradictory. Not so. The added clause merely preserved plaintiff's rights under the lease not otherwise affected by the July 23 agreement, and specifically preserved
plaintiff's claim to rent abatement under the lease. By
no means can the added clause be taken to mean the
parties intended that plaintiff may make claim for purchase and installation of the unit, for they expressed,
without ambiguity, the opposite. Had they intended that
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plaintiff could still make claim for purchase or instalh
tion, the parties could have stricken the opposite sentence
from the agreement, just as they did the "electricity and
maintenance" clause. Mr. Bullen, who was not a signatory to the agreement, may have thought or unilaterallu
intended that the addition of the clause at the end of
agreement made purchase and installation for the account
of defendants, as his affidavit, paragraph 9 says, but unexpressed thoughts or intentions are immaterial and inadmissable parol evidence offered to vary the exact terms of
the written agreement. What counts is the expression in
the contract and twice the parties mutually and clearly
expressed:
(I) "Such purchase and installation should
be your (plain tiff's) sole responsibility and all '
costs shall be borne by you (plaintiff);" and
(2) "You (plaintiff) will not make any
claim against us for the costs of purchase or in·
stallation."
Without giving effect to these promises by plaintiff,
there simply is no consideration in the agreement to sup·
port defendants' mutual promises, for plaintiff promised
nothing.
The only language that plaintiff claims makes the
agreement ambiguous is the clause added by plaintiff at
the end of the agreement, reading that plaintiff's right'
under the lease are preserved. That language must be
construed most strongly against plaintiff, the party who ,
prepared it. Powerine Co. v. Russell's, Inc., 103 Utah i

441, 135 P.2d 906.
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Whether the written contract is ambiguous is a question of law for the court. Since it is clearly not ambiguous, the trial court correctly ruled as a matter of law no
fact issue exists as to whether plaintiff bargained away its
claim for installation and purchase costs, and that plaintiff did so bargain.

POINT IV. PLAINTIFF IS NOT ENTITLED TO
RESTITUTION FOR UNJUST ENRICHMENT.
Plaintiff's claim for relief based on unjust enrichment is ill-founded, for plaintiff is bound by the bargain
contained in the letter agreement of July 23, pursuant to
which plaintiff installed the air conditioner plaintiff still
owns and pursuant to which plaintHf agreed not to sue
defendants.
Plaintiff's citation of Section I of the Restatement of
Restitution is interesting, but Section 107 thereof provides:
" (I) A person of full capacity who, pursuant to a contract with another, has performed
services or transferred property to the other or
otherwise has conferred a benefit upon him, is not
entitled to compensation therefor other than in
accordance with the terms of such bargain, unless
the transaction is rescinded for fraud, mistake,
duress, undue influence or illegality, or unless the
other has failed to perform his part of the
bargain."
Furthermore, plaintiff has continued to accept to
date the benefits conferred in it by the July 23 letter
::igreement.
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Unjust enrichment applies when one confers benefits with the reasonable expectation of repayment therefor.
The letter agreement of July 23 makes it clear that plaintiff not only did not expect reimbursement, but instead
expressly waived such claim.
CONCLUSION
This is a contract action. The contracts, i.e., the
lease and the letter agreement of July 23, 1969, are not
ambiguous, construing them as a whole. No competent
facts are in evidence to create any unpleaded fact issue
of duress or undue influence which might avoid the ve11
contracts plaintiff seeks to enforce by retaining their ben·
efits. The case is therefore one which can and should
be decided as a matter of law. The contracts unambigu·
ously waive claim for property damage and for the cost of
purchasing and installing an air conditioner, for which
plaintiff sues. Therefore, the trial court did not err in
summarily ruling, as a matter of law, plaintiff may not
recover on these iterns in accordance with the con tracts.
The judgment should be affirmed and defendant1
should be awarded their costs.
Respectfully submitted,
MOYLE & DRAPER

By

JOSEPH J. PALMER

Attorneys for Respondents
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